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Abstract 
The Social Structure of the Agricultural Extension 
Services in the Western Province of Kenya 
David K. Leonard 
Agricultural extension visits in Western Province are heavily skewed 
in favour of progressive farmers and are infrequently paid to the 
eon-innovative majority. This pattern is certainly undesirable in 
terms of income distribution but it also probably does not maximum 
the possibilities for economic growth in agriculture. In a Tanzania 
study, Thoden van Volzen argues that a similar distribution of 
government services is caused by the fact agricultural extension 
officials are part of an isolated, cohesive, social elite and that 
this involves them in a.social class alliance and exchange of benefits 
with the richer farmers. Data from Western Province confirm that 
the senior agricultural staff are part of an isolated, relatively 
cohesive elite group. The junior staff, who are in direct contact 
with farmers, form groups distinct from their seniors'.however, 
are local in their orientation, are part of the middle, not the upper, 
rural elite, and are not very cohesive. Furthermore, neither their 
middle elite social status nor any private exchange of benefits 
account for their stress on work with progressive farmers. Instead, 
it seems more likely that the progressive farmer bias is caused 
by a combination of factors, including extension ideology, the 
psychological response to receptivity and distorted perceptions 
of the rural reality. 
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THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE AGRICULTURAL EZEBNSIQM 
SEDGES IN TIB l-ESTEffl? PROVINCE CF KENYA 
David K. Leonard 
In his study of Bulambia Division in the Rungwe District of Tanzania 
Bonn* Thoden van Velzen found that the social structure «f administration 
was itself a constraint on socialist and economic development. Government 
employees were seen "by peasants and "by themselves as a highly cohesive, 
mutually interdependent elite group. They had very frequent social contaot 
with one another, apparently without regard for rank or speciality, "but 
interacted much less often with looal peasants. Maintaining a relatively 
high standard of living and speaking Swahili among themselves, they had a 
paternalistic attitude toward peasants and were disdainful of doing any 
manual work. Those locals with whom government staff did have social contact 
were almost invariably rich farmers. Staff "built up a symbiotic relation-
ship, with these rich peasants, which involved the latter providing land, 
food, and assistance on government projects to the staff.. They in their turn 
helped the well-off farmers with aocess to government aid, supported their 
dominance of local political institutions, and assisted in their conflicts 
with'yfc'her peasants. The consequences of this social system were such that 
staff were themselves prime examples of inegalitarian behaviour and, in their 
support for the rich peasants, were reinforcing and accentuating inequality 
within the rural society. Their isolation from po«rer peasants was suoh 
that they seemed to learn little from them and to provide them with relati-
vely little in the way of direct positive benefits. The tension between rich 
and poorer peasants was "such that we may infer that diffusion of innovations _ 
from the first to the second was limited.'1' 
For convenience vie can summarize Thoden van Velzen's argument in three 
proposition^: (l) the distribution »f extension benefits is,skewed in favour 
of the wealthier.farmers; (2) this favouritism accentuates rural inequality 
and may prevent the maximum possible economic growth; and.(3) part of the 
reason for the inegalitarian administration of these programmes is that the \ 
civil servants responsible for agricultural extension are part of an isolated 
oohesive, social elite and that this involves them in a social class alliance 
and exchange of benefits with the richer farmers. -i 
Thoden van Velzen's work seems to us to be provocative and important. 
For this reason we propose to examine his propositions as they might apply to 
the administration ef the extension services of the Ministry of Agriculture 
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in the Western Province of Kenya. The data analysed here are drawn from 
two sources. The first is 213 interviews we conducted with junior extension 
staff and 25 interviews with senior staff of the Ministry in 
all of Western Province. The former represent a 40% random sample of 
all junior staff in the Provinoe. The latter bomprise 85$ of all senior 
staff in the Province, other than those assigned to the Provincial head-
quarters *f the Ministry. TJie excluded senior staff were either in the 
Mechanization Division, which is not examined here, or were very new to 
the Province at the time of interviewing. The second set of data examined « 
here is drawn from a largo survey of small farmers which the Agricultural 
Statistiws Sootion of the Ministry of Finance ana Economic Planning conducted 
4 during the 1970 long rains. The survey gives us detailed information on 
5 
637 randomly selected farmers in Western Province. 
1.- _ Th d Distribution, of Extension Benefits 
From an analysis of the Agricultural Statistics data we oan gain 
* 
an accurate picture of the distribution of various easily identified farm 
characteristics. The growing of hybrid maize is one of these. Maise is 
the basic food for the great majority cf people in Western Province, and 
hybrid' maise' is a relatively recent but well—established agricultural inaowa— 
tion in the area. The package «f hybrid seed and fertilizers was introduced 
in the Province in 19^3, and hybrid maize (with or without chemical ferti-
liziers) is now grown by 48$ of the farmers there. The return on the use 
of the hybrid and fertilizer package varies, but it is not likely to be 
less than a 100$ net profit over a farmer's extra bash investment. Thus, 
a farmer is likely to have accepted hybrid maize if he has been innovative 
pver the last few years, nonetheless, the use of hybrid seed varies from 
an estimated high ef.80$ of the farms in Kimilili (Bungoma) and Lurambi 
(Kakamega) Divisions, where land holdings are large and maize is a major 
market crop, to a low of 4$ 
in %he Central "and Southern Divisions of Busia, 
where soil and climate.are less favourable and where cassava competes with 
maize as a food staple. 
Different cash producing farm enterprises are appropriate to each 
of the ecological zones in the Province, and the profitability these 
enterprises varies oonsiderably. Grade dairy oows have a very high return 
on investment, whereas the profitability cf cotton is relatively low. The 
prices on the robusta type of coffee (but not the arabiba) are so low now 
that many owners of these trees do not consider it profitable to care for 
them or to harvest the berries, Nonetheless, ownership of one of these 
farm enterprises does indicate that the farmer has had investment funds 
available at some point in the past and that he is now or was onoe deriving 
a cash income from his produce. This marks him as being of above average 
wealth in what is still a predominately subsistance economy. Farmers with 
such cash producing farm enterprises constitute 15$ of the'total in Western 
Province. 
We can define a progressive farmer as one who "both uses hybrid maize 
and has one or more cash producing-farm enterprises. Only 10$ of the farmers 
in Western- Province meet-'these two criteria. Our impression is that this 
definition approximates the minimum behaviour that Agricultural staff in 
Western Province expect of what they call a progressive -farmerv' Such a 
farmer probably has been innovative over a fair1 period of time, has Access 
to small aipounts of capital, and is well—to-do relative to his neighbours. 
Conversely, we will define a man who has neither hybrid maize nor a'cash 
enterprise as a non—innovator. In Western Province, 47$ of'the farmers' 
fall into this category. For these farmers the adoption of new farming 
methods is not a habit and access to investment capital is often a problem. 
Table . 1 • The Distribution of Agricultural Enterprises Among Farms in 
Western Province. 
Have Cash No .Cash 
Farm Enterprise Farm Enterprise Totals 
Have Hybrid 
Maize 10$ " 38$ 48$ 
Have Ho Hybrid 
Maize 5$ 47$- 52$ • 
Totals ' 15$ 85$ 
Based on a weighted sample of 637 farms. Excludes Northern Division, Busia 
and the settlement schemes in Bungoma and Kakamega Districts. Data collected 
by the Agricultural Statistics Section of the Ministry of Finance and Econo-
mic Planning during the 1970 long rains. 
A cash farm enterprise is defined as one of the following: 
grade cattle, coffee, cotton or tea. •1 .» 
Of course, it does not follow automatically from a farmer's being 
progressive that he is relatively rich. For this reason the Agricultural 
Statistics Section's survey data on cattle holdings is particularly inter-
esting. In the past cattle were overwhelmingly the symbol and substanceo • t 
of wealth in rural Kenya. Although this traditional attachment to cattle 
has diminished in Western Province, a Luhya's wealth is still likely to be 
reflected in his livestock holdings. Thus, it is interesting to note that 
those who grow hybrid maize in Western Province are twice as likely to have 
five or more cattle as those who do not grow it. (For the purposes of this 
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exorcise one grade cow is counted as,equal to two local cattle, the difference 
in their market value.) • Furthermore, those whom we have defined as progre-
ssive farmers are cne eighth as likely to have no tattle as those whom we 
have labled non-innovative. (See table 2) 
Thus we see a fairly dear relationship between progressiveness and 
wealth.. The only exception is that small category of farmers who have adopted 
a cash crop but not hybrid maise. These are very much like the po^r farmers 
in their livestock wealth. The bulk of farmers in this category raise cotton 
in Busia. As cotton seed is provided free to the grower, it is the one cash 
crop which does not require a capital investment to plant and hence is acce-
ssible to the poor* • Unfortunately, cash investment is required for insecti-
cides if the plant is to produce yields, so most farmers in this category 
will be disappointed by their harvest and remain p*or. 
Having identified the proportions of farmers who can T»e called prog«-
ressive and non-innovative, we now have a base line against whibh to compare 
the actual distribution of agricultural extension services. The basic tech-
nique »f extension in Western Province is visits to individual farmers. On 
7 
average, 2.9 days in an agent's five day week will be spent on this activity. 
In our interviews we asked each staff member who works in direct contact 
with farmers to name for uls all the farmers to whom he had paid extension 
visits in the previous week. For each of these farmers w<3 then inquired 
as to whether he grew hybrid maize and as to whether he had a cash farm 
enterprise. In the Province as a whole, the average extension agent spends 
57$ °f his visits with progressive farmers (who are 10$ si all farmers) and 
6$ of his visits with non-innovative ones (47$ of the total). Thus extension 
attention is very greatly skewed in favour of the more progressive and weal-
thier-farmers, exactly as Thoden van Velzen found in Rungwe, Tanzania. 
' \ 
Furthermore, the concentration on progressive farmers is achieved a^  the 
expense of the non—innovative ones. Farmers-who have either hybrid Wise 
or a ©ash crop but not both are 43$ of the total and extension agents devote, 
an average of 37$ of their visits to them. A farmer in this middle category, 
who has shown some innovative drive, has about l/7th the chance that\a prog-
ressive farmer has of receiving an extension visit. But his odds are 
still 6.5 times those of a non-innovative farmer, who has l/44th the chance 
of a progressive farmer. (See Fig.l.) 
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II. The Progressive Farmer and Economic Growth 
Is the stress that is placed on progressive farmers in extension 
work necessarily undesirable? After all, the mass of extension workers openly 
and e>onsciously favour an emphasis cn progressive farmers. In a Tanzania-
wide opinion survey of farmer e»ontact extension agents, R.G. Saylor found 
that 87$ agree with the statement "If I worked most of the time with a 
few of the "better farmers, I would get hotter results". This sentiment was 
expressed despite the fact that it runs contrary to the offieial policy of g 
the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Go—operatives. 
As Thoden van Velaen notes in his article, there are powerful arguments 
associated with the ""betting on the strong" position. It .was once the official 
ideology of agricultural extension throughout East Africa, and it is widely 
accepted by extension offioials in Kenya. The strategy r>oncentratc-s on 
getting the most receptive farmers (i.e. progressive) in an area to adopt a 
new agricultural practise and then letting the innovation diffuse to other 
farmers by the force of their example. We have neither the evident nor the 
inclination to settle the debate over the progressive farmer strategy for 
Kenya, but we do have a few tentative thoughts based on a small number of 
interviews whioh we conducted with farmers in the Vihiga Division of Western 
Province. At least some farmers who have no personal contact with extension 
workers are getting new agricultural information from other farmers who do 
have suck .contacts.. Thus diffusion of new information does occur. Nonetheless, 
1 equal distribution line 
visit s/Non-innovat ors 
Percent of Farmers 
Figure 1. The Distribution of Agricultural Extension Visits 
Between Progressive, Middle, and IIon-innovative 
Farmers. 
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i"t seems to us that this second-hand, information often loses something in 
the process of transmission. 'The several farmers who we' interviewed who 
had heard of a hybrid maize innovation only through other farmers had no o 
idea if the change would increase yields/ Without yield information, an 
innovation f>ommunit.ated to others carries little conviction and is unlikely 
to be adopted. Yet it is uncommon for farmers in Western Frovince to freely 
reveal the amount of profit they have made from an innovation, Publicised 
interns differentials may give rise to a.higher tax assessment, increased 
social obligations, jealousiesf or even, rarely, accusations of witchcraft. 
Thus most Luhya farmers probably require a new institutional 'context in which 
discissions -on profits are expected'in order to talk readily about yields."^ 
This problem is important, for the diffusion of innovations strategy depends 
on widespread ssommunination of agricultural information. The strategy is 
unsound where there are social barriers to the transmission proccss. 
Whatever,the advantages of. the' progressive farmer as a diffusion point 
for information, it seems undesirable that the method should be translated 
into an undifferentiated philosophy of working onls?- with progressives. 
When a broadly applicable innovation, sueh. as hyvrid maize, is first being 
introduced, it may be wise to begin with the progressives as being those 
most able and willing.to take the associated risks. One?; the new practioe 
has gained a foothold, however, it would seem desirable to shift attention 
toward the less innovative farmers so as to speed the spread of adoption® 
It ?an be inferred from Table 3 that,sueh a strategic change in focus does 
not occur. General extension agents, who carry the burden of work on hybrid 
maise, give only a'tiny proportion of their time to the half of the Province's 
farmers who do not grow it* Further, they devote at least as many visits to 
progressives as do their specialist colleagues, who have muoh more justifi-
cation for working with an advanced clientele. 
Table 3» Average Percentage of..Extension Visits, to Progressive and Pcilyini^g^vG 
Farmers By Agents with Differing Functions. - ^ 
Average $ to Average $ to Non-
Progressive Farmers^ innovative Farmers'' 
Function: 
General (88) 60 3 
Coffee (10) 91 0 
Animal Husbandry (7) 57 0 
Supervisory (13) 52 4 
IDA Loans (19) 39 5 
Cotton (9). 57 . - 19 
Veterinary (32) 17 
All (178) 57 6 
It is also interesting that those extension agents who give the least 
attention to progressives are those concentrating on loan investigations and. 
that those who work most with poor farmers are veterinary and cotton specia-
lists. The areas in whith a farmer is most likely to expressly demand an 
agenife services are loans and veterinary medicine. Despit the fact that 
wealthier farmers (by virture of having mo.re cattle and better credit worthi-
ness) are more likely to ask for these se-rsies than are the nonr-progressives, 
the latter receive a "better share of the .attention of those specialists than 
they do in other extension fields. Thus, progressive cattle owners receive 
only 7,"times the attention given by veterinary staff to non-innovative cattle 
owners, whereas the ratio for agricultural visits between progressive and 
nen—innovative farmers is 44-tl • This phenomenon suggests that general exten-
sion agents are overemphasising progressive farmers, even within the framework 
of a "betting on the strong" approach. That this bias in farmer visits tan 
bo overcome to ..some, extent even within the present system is suggested by the 
cotton workers, x-Jho, faced with a campaign to extend cotton acreage, are 
reaching out to some previously non—innovative farmers. This is not "to deny 
the difficulties of working with poor farmers. .As we noted earlier, it is'" 
easy to get cotton planted, as the seed is free, but hard to get it adequately 
cared for, as the purchase of insecticides takes money. 'To convince a farmer 
to plant cotton when he has n.p prospect of finding the cash for its care is 
self-defeating. Nevertheless, the data reported .earlier on livestock holdings 
suggests that a third of the non-innovative farmers could sell one cow in order 
to make alternate investments. 
To this point wo have indicated some reservations about the effective-
ness of the progressive farmer approach as an optimum strategy for diffusing 
innovations. We also have argued that even if the strategy is accepted, many 
actual and potential farm innovators are being ignored through a concentration 
on the most progressive cultivators. If'these points are accepted, it fol3iOWS 
that the current distribution of extension services in Western Province is 
not maximizing the possibilities for economic growth. We feel that a broader 
range of. extension oontacts would probably lead to profitable innovations 
achieving -wide-spread acceptance more rapidly. Further, that the bulk of 
these services is being provided to the progressive and wealthier farmers 
means that they also are helping to increase the gap between the rich and 
the poor. We do not mean here that rural inequality is caused by the agri-
cultural extension services. The farmers who are already somewhat better 
eff than their neighbours are in the "best position to invest in new, profit-
able farm enterprises, and we must expect that they will do so'and'h^nce 
increase their wealth. If the farm economy is based on land, labour, oapital 
and knowledge, those who have more of these will make more money from their 
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farming. But it does not follow that those who have the' most of the first 
three should also ho provided with a" disproportionate advantage by extension 
workers with respect to technical knowledge. From th<j point of view of inosme 
distributions, and eoonomic growth, the middle farmer, who has some capital 
and a demonstrated interest in change, would seem the rational target for 
extension. Although evidence is lacking, it seems likely that profitable 
innovations will spread speedily to his more progressive neighbours (more 
quickly than the other direction). The loss wealthy also will be provided 
with a resource (knowledge) which will partly compensate for his disadvan-
tage with respect to capital. 
III. The Social Systems of the Agricultural Staff i• 
We have accepted Thoden van Velsen's propositions that the distribution 
of extension benefits is skewed in favour of the more progressive and weal-
thier farmers, that this favouritism does not produce the maximum in econo-
mic growth and that it increases rural inequality. We. now need to examine 
his proposition that this inegalitarian behaviour is partly caused by the 
fact that agricultural extension agents are part of an isolated, cohesive 
social elite. This requires that we begin with a detailed analysis of the 
social structure of the Ministry of Agriculture in Wc-sternFProvince, 
. Let us start with an outline of the formal structure of agricultural 
administration. (See Fig.2). At the district level, the Ministry is headed 
by a District Agricultural Officer (DAO). He is supported at the headquarters 
by several specialist personnel of both degree (Agricultural or Veterinary 
Officer) and diploma levels (Assistant Agricultural or Livestock Officer). 
In charge of each division is an Assistant Agricultural Officer (AAO), who 
is sometimes joined by a Livestock Officer (LO). At the divisional head-
quarters there are usually a few holders of certificates in agriculture 
(Agricultural Assistants, AAs) or veterinary medicine (Animal Health-Assis-
tants - AHAs). These AAs and AHAs will be performing specialist duties, such 
as proeessing IDA loans, farm planning, and organizing 4-K Clubs. Very 
occasionally these AAs and AHAs may be assisted by a Junior Agricultural 
Assist,ant or Junior Animal Health Assistant, who lack^any formally recog-
nised. training in agriculture. Each location will have a team of extension 
workers, varying in size from seven to twenty—one. The agricultural part of 
this team will be headed by a location .Agricultural Assistant (LAA) and will 
be comprised of AAs and JAAs. In addition the Veterinary Division will be 
represented by one to seven AHAs and JAHAs. Most of this team will be assigned 
to specific sub-locations for general extension work, although the Animal Health 
jjersonnel and one or two Agricultural ones may work on a speciality, such as 
coffee or cotton, over the entire location. 
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District Level I 
L 
Divisional Level 
Location Level I 
I 
Sub-location { 
District Agricultural Officer 
/ 
1 Vet. Of. Agric. Of. (Crops Asst.Agric. Of(Farm 
Management) 
A.A.O. i/c division 
AA (Coffee) AA (Farm Management) 
JAHAs 
JAAs (Coffee) 
a line of formal and actual authority and responsibility 
a line of formally established but challengeable 
authority and responsibility 
Fig. 2. An Example of a 'Typical' Organisation Chart for the Ministry 
of Agriculture in Western Province. 
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The Animal Health personnel used to have an autonomous organization 
from that of the Agriculture staff, although the basic eharacteristics of 
the two groups are quite similar, Father than further.complieate the follo-
wing presentation with two parallel sets of statistics, we will exclude the 
junior veterinary staff from our analysis from here forward. 
Following the generally accepted convention* we will term those staff 
who have degrees or diplomas senior staff and those who have certificates or 
no formal training .junior staff. To state it another way,- those whose title 
includes the word "Officer" are senior staff and those whose designation 
involves the word "Assistant" are junior staff. As a rule junior staff work 
"" in or near their home area, while senior staff work outside it. In order to 
more easily discuss the AAs who are in charge of locations or on divisional 
duties (and who enjoy superior status and responsibility to the other junior 
staff) we will label them senior AAs. 
So much for formal hierarchies." What then are the <>hara<?teristics of 
the informal social system of the agricultural administration? My main data 
for studying this.question are the friendship choices of staff. At the end 
of each interview, which was very much work oriented, we asked, "Now finally, 
we find that an extension agent's work is often helped or hindered by his 
personal relations with those around him. For this reason we would be grate-
ful if you would name for us your friends whom you see regularly." Where the 
respondent was unclear, we stated that we were interested in his friends in 
this general geographical area and that our question included all types of 
friends. After this first quefy was answered, we probed with "How, in addition, 
what (other) friends do you have in the Ministry of Agriculture?" In total 
we recored up to 15 friendship choices of which no more than 10 were from 
outside the Ministry of Agriculture. In only a very few cases were these 
upper limits reached. In addition we ascertained the nature of each friend's 
occupation and where he lived. Co-operation in answering all these questions 
was generally very good. In using this sociometric.data to describe the in-
formal social system of the Ministry of Agrioulture, we do not want to imply 
that social structure consists only of friendship patterns. This is obviously 
not the base. When one claims.another as his friend, one is not saying either 
that he sees this person often, or that he does not interact frequently with 
others. A friendship choice only indicates those with whom one likes or would 
like to have contact. Nonetheless, this information is extremely useful in 
locating the boundaries of peoples' affections, which in turn is helpful in identify 
status and other barriers between people. 
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Our first problem is to establish, the social units we are to analyse. 
If we define a socially salient group as one within which friendships are 
formed, it is clear that we can take the Ministry of Agriculture as a mean-
ingful unit to its staff. An average of 51$ of the friends named, by senior 
staff are from within Agriculture, prior to any probing by us in this direc-
tion. Junior staff name an average of 24$» which indicates a less intense 
but still significant social involvement in the Ministry. For senior staff 
an average" of 37$ -of" their friends are in other Government employment and 
only 12$ are not civil servants. Junipr'staff name an average of 35$ in other 
Government employment and 41$ outside- bf the civil service. Thoden van Velzen's 
proposition that Government employees are enmeshed in an almost exclusively 
civil servant social circuit is verified for the senior staff. Junior staff in 
Kakamcga are only predominately involved in Government circles, however, 
and retain a significant number of contacts outside. One explanation for 
the difference between-junior and senior staff in this regard is that the. 
latter are more distant from their places of birth, and, more importantly, 
I 
live in Government staff compounds. 
The Ministry of Agriculture- itself is not an undifferentiated social 
unit.. The senior staff at district headquarters tend to be a socially cohesive 
group, and this • social system reaches out in a weak but distinct' manner to 
include the senior staff in the divisions. Kerlingcr suggests that we measure 
the cohesiveness of a group by the proportion of reciprocal friendship choices 
made out of the number possible. On this measure.the ratio among the head-
quarters staffs of the three districts are .30, .33, and .17. The figures 
for the whole senior staff in these districts are .19, .13, and .06. Another 
way to measure the same phenomenon is to give the average proportion of other 
group members which individuals name as their friends. Here the headquarters', 
figures are .42, ,50, and .30, while those for the full districts are .36, .30, 
and .16. The involvement of the divisional AAOs and LOs in a district wide 
senior staff social system is clearly weak, although existent. This is not 
surprising as they would -need transportation to roach their counterparts, 
and this is a notoriously scarce resource in the Ministry. Although the cohe-
siveness for two of the three headquarters team is moderately good,.it does 
seem low for groups which share common offices, a common speciality, and 
common problems. The high rates of transfer in the Kenyan senior civil service 
doubtless depress the levels of group cohesion. 
The junior staff at location level are very 'weak in their cohesiveness. 
The average proportion of other group members named as friends is .26 (with a 
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range of .06 to .46)0 The proportion of reciprocal friendship choices 
averages only .06 (with a range from .00 to .25). Despite these lev; figures, 
46% of the Ministry friends that an individual names are working in the same 
location with him, and we estimate .that an additional 2"]% arc in another part 
of the same division. Furthermore, no less than oy/s of the junior staff are 
12 
named as a friend "by at least one other junior member. These statistics 
indicate to us that the level of junior staff interaction is by no means as 
great as.Thoden van Velsen's work would have suggested. Nonetheless there 
does appear to be some kind of weak informal social system among junior staff, 
focused on the location and even more weakly including the division, but not 
reaching beyond it. 
But do the senior and junior.staff social systems overlap? If they 
do, they are certainly not cohesive, for tally one Officer (anAAO) makes a 
reciprocal friendship choice with a.junior staff member. If we include all 
of the senior staff in our analysis, the statistics show clearly that they 
do not belong to the junior staff social systems and vice versa. But we wish 
to argue that the Luhya, i.e. local, members pf senior staff are involved 
in the junior staff systems, weak as they are, and that the others are isolated-
from them. In order to make the point, let us compare the two groups of senior 
staff with the senior Ms, who are the junior staff with any comparable status 
and visibility. Table 4 shows how the Luhya senior staff are seen in ways 
very similar to the senior AAs while both are quite different from the non— 
Luhya senior staff. Table 5 takes the point further by demonstrating that 
Luhya senior staff themselves relate socially tc their juniors much more than 
Table 4* The Frequency With Which One is Named, a ifriend by Junior Staff 
Average times Number in 
chosen oategoiy 
Non-Luhya Senior Staff 1.79 14 
Luhya Senior Staff 4.48 11 
Senior AAs 4.21 34 
Other AAs 3.82 45 
JAAs 2.16 89 
Table 5* Frequency- with which One Namc-s Non—Senior AAs and 
i iOmt . -m » w i • I • HI' i i m t i -in mi. nil • • • n I m mmm.m * » .- • r - - — , • • JMs as Friends 
Average Number Number in 
of Choices Category 
Non-Luhya Senior Staff .21 .14 
Luhya Senior Staff 1.27 11 
Senior AAs 2.41 31 
do thpir non-local oolleagues. All <»f this means that Luhya members of senior 
staff, especially if they are stationed in a division, are often part of the-
divisional informal social system of the junior staff (although not quite as 
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much, as their senior AAs are). The other senior staff are isolated from 
their subordinatesT informal networks. Thus for any one area there are 
two distinct social systems, a junior and a senior one, and usually only the 
Luhya senior staff enjoy the possibility of overlapping membership. On a 
divisional basis it is clear that Thoden van Velzen's suggestion that the 
staff social system is strongly cohesive and undifferentiated is not appli-
cable to Western Province. 
Having established their distinctness, let us now proceed to analyse 
the senior.and junior staff systems separately. We might begin by asking 
what is the social status of the people with whom senior staff associate? 
The pattern is quite different between those stationed at the district head-
quarters and those in the divisions. Table 6 analyses the friends chosen 
outside of Agriculture and presents the average percent chosen at each status 
level. We sec that district senior staff.draw 83$ of their friends from 
people of equivalent status to themselves, in effect the highest status group 
in the area. Socially speaking, this makes them very isolated from the reali-
Table 6. Average Percentage of Friends Chosen From Bach Status Category 
Status or Equivalent Respondent 
of Friends 
District Divisional All Senior 
Senior Staff Senior Staff Staff • 
District head of dept. 61$ 13$ 37$ 
Divisional head of dept. or 
district aid 22 36 29 
Chiefs, Teachers' 10 20 15 
Lesser employees, traders, 
farmers ? 30 19 
ties of their areas. The divisional staff name friends in this high level 
group only 49$ of the time. Nonetheless, this is far in excess of the 14$ 
or less named in this category by senior AAs, and supports.the hypothesis 
that when divisional senior staff do interact with farmers, the farmers are 
almost certainly rich ones,. 
Turning again to the junior staff social systems, we have already 
established that these groups are not very cohesive or intense, drawing only 
24$ of th eir members' friendship choices. The social units seem concentrated 
on the location although they involve divisional level interaction as well. 
Approximately 73$ of the friends that junior staff name in the Ministry live 
within their home division and 46$ are members of their location work group. 
Junior staff friendships with non-Itinistry people are even less cosmopolitan 
Forty-five percent of these live in the extension agent's home sub-location, 
and 30$ more are from within his location. 
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What is th<? social status of the friends with whom the junior staff 
interact socially, and, "by inference, what social'status do they assign to 
themselves? We asked respondents to tell us what kind of work each friend 
does. On this "basis each non—Ministry friend was assigned to one of four 
predetermined status categories and the percentage of friends in these cate-
gories was calculated for each respondent,"^ Table 7 defines the four cate-
gories and givc-s the average percent of friends in cach one. From these 
figures it seems clear that junior staff see themselves as part of the rural 
elite, hut in the lower or middle part of that group. The data confirm our 
Table 7 
in Various Status Categories 
Percent Category Exemplary Definition 
7 High Chiefs, headmasters, County Councillors, 
big businessmen, other relatively. well-to-do.. 
39 Upoer Middle School teachers,'sub-chiefs, moderate business-
men, big fanners,.middle salaried group. 
33 Middle Small businessmen, traders, moderate farmers, 
Lesser employed. 
20 Low Average farmers. 
impression that they belong to a status a bit lower than that of a primary 
sehool teacher. As the.Western Province progressive farmer fits more into 
the middle status group, the agricultural extension agent is probably more 
often his social equal rather than his status superior,.contrary to what is 
suggested by Thoden van Velzen's analysis, nonetheless, these data do support 
his assertion that staff associate very largely with the richer peasants in 
their sosial contacts with farmers. The approximately 90% of the rural popu-
lation whieh falls into the Ijow Status category received only 2?$ of the 
friendship choices. 
IV. The Causes of Extension Bias 
Is it then'true that agricultural extension staff visit progressive 
farmers because theses are their acquaintances or are the people most like 
themselves socially? Our limited evidence indicates that the answer is no. 
There is no positive correlation between the percentage of an agent's high 
and upper middle status friends and the.proportion of his visits -yhich he 
devotes to progressive farmers (r=—,12, Sig,*= e08)r . If anything* there is 
a slight -tendency for those who name the smallest percentage of friends in 
the high and upper middle groups iro give a larger proportion of their time 
to progressive farmers than do the.staff who identify more with the elite. 
Nor does it seem crediT"L£%.to argue, as Thoden van Velzcn does, that extension 
- 14 -
services arc "being provided "to progressive farmers in Western Province as 
a reward for their help in official and private affairs. This exchange of 
benefits does occur in Kenya, but it will not serve as a dominant explanatory 
variable.1"^ Those services that are most desirable to progressive farmers -
loans and veterinary medicine - are better distributed among the classes of 
farmers than are the other types of extension visits. 
Extension agents make more visits to the most innovative farmers than 
is rational even within the framework of ^ progressive farmer strategy. But 
they seem to us to do so for considerably less exciting reasons than a social 
class alliance or a trade-off in favours. First, many extension agents believe-
in the strategy as an undifferentiated one of always stressing the progressives. 
They would accept the figures on visit differentials given here as a reflec-
tion of a sound approach. The progressive farmer ideology is a strong one 
in extension circles. Officers are not yet aware of misgivings about the 
strategy that are now being expressed in academic circles, and its aclcnowledged 
problems are often dismissed as inevitabilities. Furthermore, extension agents 
sc-e their function primarily as that of maximising eoonoipdc growth, not as 
assuring a better distribution of income. This reasoned, conscious policy 
15 
choir^ e is obviously the major e>ause for stress cn progressive farmers. None-
theless, it is true that the bias toward progressive farmers also exists for 
veterinary visits, where no issue of extension strategy is involved. The 
rational arguments for stress on the progressives are probably butressed by 
unconscious variables. One of these is that a visit to a progressive farmer 
is psychologically more satisfying. Che oan expect to encounter less resis-
tance to new or difficult farming practices, and one is more likely to see a 
change on that.particular farm. Therefore, the agent feels he is getting.c 
fetter results, as did the extension workers polled in Tanzania by Saylor, 
It is emotionally difficult to ac<sept that a better long-run, total impact 
may be achieved in one's area by working with somewhat less receptive farmers. 
Net effects are hard to see whereas the contacted farmer is immediate and 
real. The second reason for junior staff visiting progressive farmers is 
that these farmers are the ones most likely to complain to a senior offioer 
if extension is not provided to them, M s and JAAs do only a small amount 
of work and often seem to organize themselves informally t<? reduce the amount 16 
of effort they put into their jobs. In such a situation, the agent sees 
the ©omplainers and forgets the rest. This helps to explain the fact that 
those junior staff working on specialities for which there is wide demand 
also show the broadest distribution of their services. Finally, extension • 
ignores poor farmers because it has a distorted picture of the small agricul-
ture worlds Senior staff in particular are likely to have an optimistic view 
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of tho degree of acceptance of modern farming* Joseph Ascroft was told'"by 
agricultural.officers in IJyori that Tetu Division had 100$ acceptance of 
hybrid maize, hut his random survey of 354- farmers found only 31% growing 
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the crop. The-social isolation of senior staff from the areas in which ' 
they a^e working helps sustain these distorted perceptions. Even junior 
staff, who are largely drawn from the communities in which they work, have 
an optimistically biased view of their areas. This is well illustrated by 
the reactions of the AAs who conducted tho preliminary survey of farmers 
for the current Vihiga Division extension experiment. Confronted with a 
genuinely random sample, they confessed that they load never realized that 
such poor people even existed in the areas in which they were working. 
That they neglected these farmers partly out of ignorance is shown by the 
fact that these AAs apparently now have a strong commitment to working with 
these rural poor."^ 
In summary, Thoden van Velzen is correct that the distribution of ex-
tension is skewed in favour of the wealthier farmers and that this favouri-
tism accentuates rural;inquality.and probably prevents the maximum possible 
overall economio growth* In fact, this phenomenon is probably gc-neral to 
• 19-
all agricultural extension systems and only tho degree of the problem varies* 
Our data from Western Province also confirm that the senior agricultural, 
staff are part of an isolated,.relatively cohesive elite group.. W« found, 
however, that the junior staff, who are in contact with farmers, form groups 
distinct from their seniors' and that they are.local in their orientation, 
part of the middle, not the upper, rural elite, and are not very cohesive. 
Consequently they arc only partially isolated from their communities. 
Furthermore, neither their middle elite social status nor any private exchange 
of benefits accounts for their stress on work with progressive farmers. Thus 
this proposition of Thoden van Velaen's is not sustained in Western Kenya. 
The bias of junior staff toward progressive farmers seems to be better explained 
by a combination of an imperfect understanding of tho progressive farmer 
strategy, a weak commitment to their work, the pattern of farmer demand for 
extension services, and a somewhat distorted perception of the proportion of 
rural societies made up of progressive farmers. An even more optimistic view 
of their areas is held by the senior staff and is doubtless sustained by the 
isolation of all except the officers of local origin from their subordinates 
and the local community. The explanations which we have advanced for the 
progressive farmer bias leave us mere hopeful than weald the exchange and 
social class alliance proposition ef Thoden van Velzen. The factors we have 
advanoed as leading to the disadvantage of the less wealthy farmers may be 
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organisationally manipulate. The skew might -well he lessened "by Ministry 
programmes that carefully redefined extension strategy, developed very 
specific guidelines for working with the middle or even bottora rungs of 
farmers, and gave the agent some solid hasis for resisting progressive 
farmer demands. Thus the social harriers to a more egalitarian administra-
tive penetration of the countryside may he surmountable. 
- 17 -
F 0 0 T N 0 T E J5 
1. E.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, "Staff, Kulak and Peasant", 
proceeding chapter in this volume. 
2. These data were collected during 1970 and early 1971 while I was a 
Junior Research Fellow of the Institute' for Development Studies of 
the University of Nairobi. The research project out of which.these 
data are drawn has been supported generously by the Institute. I 
also would like to express my appreciation for the invaluable research 
assistance of Bernard Chahilu, Edwin A. Luchemo, Jack K. Tumwa, and 
Humphries W' Opindi. Thanks are also due to Neils Roling for comments 
on an earlier draft of this paper. 
3. Details,of the sampling strategy followed may be found in David If, 
Leonard, Humphries W'Opindi, Edwin "A. Luohemo,' and Jack K. Tumwa, 
"The Work Performance of Junior Agricultural Extension Staff in 
Western.Province:- Basic Table's" (Nairobi: Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi, 197l) , p.I. Note too that the settle— 
4 T 
ment schemes in Kakamega and Bungoma were' not studied and that on 
the >asis of random selection, the Northern Division of Busia District 
did nots fall in the sample, 
4. We are extremely grateful to the Ministry for making these data 
available to us. The analysis and interpretation' of these data are 
our complete responsibility, and the views expressed should not be 
interpreted as reflecting those of the Agricultural Statistics Section 
nor of the Kenya Government» 
5« This number of 637 excludes interviews conducted on settlement schemes 
and in the Northern Division of Busia District. Neither of.those 
had been included in our initial study of extension workers, and they 
were excluded here so as to give us comparable information between the 
two sets of material. 
6. I am grateful to my colleague W. Cuma Cyugi for this insight, which he 
gained during research in South Nyanza. 
7. D.K. Leonard, "Organizational Structures for 'Productivity in Agricul-
tural Extension", in D.K. Leonard, editor, Rural Administration in 
Kenya (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, forthcoming).. 
8. R = G. Saylor, "An Opinion Survey of Bwana Shambas in Tanzania", (*Dar Es 
Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar Es Salaam, 1970) 
pp. 12, 17. 
- 18 -
9. David K. Leonard -with Bernard Chahilu and Jack Tumwa, "Some Hypothesis 
Concerning the.Impact of Kenya Government Agricultural Extension on 
Small Farmers", (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University 
of Nairobi, 1970) pp. 6, 7, 10-12, 13. 
lb. I am indebted to former chief Mathew Mwenesi for this particular point 
and to him and former locational rlerk Benjamin Kapitain for confirming 
my intuition on this general problem. 
11. Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioural Research (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1964) P. 559. •r 
12. As our sampling unit was the location and not the division we only 
'rrarely interviewed all the staff in a division. This means that some 
staff may have had friends who would have named them but whom we missed. 
13. My Luhya research assistants and I established these categories on the 
"oasis of our perceptions of status differentia in Western Province. 
They are judgemental only and are open to criticism, even though we 
believe them to be basically accurate. The main problem with the 
classification system concerns tho placement of farmers who are net 
running large commercial enterprises. Generally, what we have here_ 
termed the progressive farmers would have been put.in the Middle cate-
gory and all others in the Low one. Unfortunately, there were doubt-
less errors of judgement here when the coding was done in the interview. 
We believe that this problem was not serious enough tc invalidate the 
results. 
14. Mr. tf.D.N. Olewe, now of the Institute for Development Studies, 
University of Nairobi, has some information on such trading of favours 
in the co-operatives in the Kisumu area. 
15. That what we have reported of extension iehaviour is consistent with 
intended action was firmly driven home in a discussion we had with 
Mr. Kimani, the Provincial Director of Agriculture, and Mr. Gatheru, 
the Provincial Farm Management Officer. Both men arc in positions too 
high for them to be influenced in this policy decision by the social 
persuasions or favours of loeal farmers. 
16. Leonard, "Organizational Structures for Productivity in Agricultural 
Extension". 
17. Joseph Ascroft, "The Tetu Extension Pilot Project" (paper read at the 
Workshop on Strategies for Improving Rural Welfare, University of Nairobi, 
1971), P . 17 

